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Relaunching the G20 
E x e c u t i v e  s u m m a r y  
After a positive start, the G20 has drawn increasing criticism over its 
loss of focus and its failure to deal with major global economic issues. 
This has brought into question its role as the premier forum for 
international economic cooperation. 
In fact, the G20 has achieved a great deal. Much of the criticism is 
harsh, and expectations as to what it can realistically achieve are 
excessive. Nevertheless, there is a danger of the forum losing its way. If 
the G20 is to live up to its potential and contribute to a stronger and 
more stable international economic environment it needs to sharpen its 
focus and effectiveness. This requires a circuit-breaker to move away 
from the current approach where each year’s chair largely extends the 
agenda and processes it inherits from the previous chair.  
The G20 can learn from its own history, from the things it has done 
well and those that it has done poorly. Nine key lessons from previous 
Summits suggest that the G20 should develop an explicit multi-tracked 
approach where a wide range of issues continue to be discussed and 
advanced among G20 members through ministers and officials, but the 
leaders’ meeting (and communiqué) is focused on a few key issues. 
Given the vulnerabilities confronting the global economy, the priority 
for leaders should be on economic issues. And the Framework for 
Strong Sustainable and Balanced Growth should be the touchstone and 
central narrative of the G20. 
As chair of the G20 in 2014, Australia has the opportunity to make a 
clean break with the past. In particular, the careful selection and 
handling of the leaders’ agenda could help to establish a new precedent 
that leaders should only focus on the priority issues and those where 
they can achieve meaningful outcomes. 
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The G20: positive start but growing 
criticism 
 
The establishment of the G20 Leaders’ Summits 
has been a significant development in global 
economic leadership. This was underlined by 
the forum’s initial response to the global 
financial crisis. US President Barack Obama 
described the G20’s London Summit in April 
2009 as a ‘turning point in our pursuit of 
global economic recovery’, with the G20 
leaders agreeing to ‘unprecedented steps to 
restore growth and prevent a crisis like this 
from happening again’.
1
 
 
Outside observers shared the President’s view. 
Colin Bradford and Johannes Linn 
characterised the London Summit as ‘…an 
enormous success in stopping the drop in the 
global economy, in strengthening the financial 
and institutional capacity of the international 
community to address future crises, and in 
pushing for national and global financial 
regulation reform.’
2
 They even predicted that 
‘…in coming years, the London G-20 Summit 
will be seen as the most successful summit in 
history, eclipsing the G8’.
3
 
 
More recently, however, critics have questioned 
whether the G20 is living up to its role as the 
premier forum for international economic 
cooperation. Countries outside the G20 have 
claimed it lacks legitimacy because it is 
unrepresentative, despite the fact that G20 
members contribute over 80 per cent of global 
economic output. Recent leaders’ summits have 
been described as being little more than talk-
shops that have delivered few real outcomes.  
 
Chris Giles, writing in the Financial Times on 
18 June 2012, in the lead-up to the Los Cabos 
Summit, charged that ‘living up to its billing as 
the world’s premier economic forum was 
always going to be a challenge for the Group of 
20. After a string of failures, the task for the 
Los Cabos G20 summit is to stop the rot and 
prevent the organisation from becoming 
irrelevant’. He concluded: ‘Despite the hype 
surrounding the April 2009 London summit, 
when leaders promised a new global economic 
order, the reality has been sobering.... It has the 
right countries around the table, but the sheer 
size of the G20 prevents spontaneous 
discussion, participants say. Sterile debates 
without any chance of agreement by countries 
to change policies are the order of the day.’
4
 
 
What is more troubling is that public interest in 
the G20 agenda seems to be diminishing. 
‘National Perspectives on Global Leadership 
(NPGL)’ is a joint project by CIGI and the 
Brookings Institution that observes how 
national publics in G20 countries perceive their 
leaders at global summits, as seen through local 
media reporting.
5
 Its survey after the 2012 Los 
Cabos G20 Summit found little or no interest 
in issues on the formal agenda, such as 
financial regulatory reform and ‘green 
growth’.
6
 What captured greatest public 
interest were issues that were discussed by 
leaders in the margins of the Summit, such as 
the conflict in Syria.  
 
Much of the criticism of the G20 is harsh, and 
expectations of what it can realistically achieve 
have been excessive. The G20 has 
shortcomings, but it is an active forum of 
international economic consultation at the 
highest level. In a highly integrated global 
economy, cooperation and dialogue are 
essential.   
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Nevertheless, some of the critics of the G20 
have a point. Real leadership will be required 
from within the forum for it to realise its full 
potential. To date, the G20 has evolved in line 
with the ambitions and processes of the 
countries that chair it each year. The agenda 
has largely become cumulative. If this approach 
continues, the danger is that the forum will 
become weighed down by procedural baggage 
and an expanding agenda, and will lose what 
has been the key ingredient to its success so far 
– the direct involvement of the leaders and 
ministers of member states in dealing with the 
main challenges confronting the global 
economy. The G20 needs strategic direction 
and broad agreement as to its objectives, 
structure and processes. 
 
As an open, trading economy, it is vital for 
Australia that the G20 lives up to its potential 
and contributes to a stronger and more stable 
global economic environment. As a member of 
the G20 Troika in 2013 – comprising the past, 
present and future chairs of the forum – and as 
chair of the forum in 2014, Australia is in a 
position to help make that happen. One of 
Australia’s goals as chair of the G20 in 2014 
should be to put in place arrangements that will 
help ensure that, as the forum develops, it will 
remain focused and effective. 
 
Towards that end, it is time to relaunch the 
G20, building on its strengths and streamlining 
its operations. The first step should involve 
reflecting on the history of the G20 and 
understanding what has worked and what has 
not. 
 
 
 
 
Nine lessons from the history of the G20  
 
The groundwork for the inaugural G20 leaders’ 
summit in November 2008 commenced in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. 
At their meeting in Washington, DC, in 
September 1998, G7 finance ministers and 
central bank governors proposed broadening 
the dialogue among systemically significant 
economies.
7
 It was recognised that a more 
representative forum than the G7 was needed 
to deal with the global implications of the 
Asian crisis.  
 
After meetings of various groupings of 
countries, the first meeting of G20 finance 
ministers and central bank governors was held 
in Berlin in December 1999. Its goals were ‘to 
provide a new mechanism for informal 
dialogue in the framework of the Bretton 
Woods institutional system, to broaden the 
discussions on key economic and financial 
policy issues among systemically significant 
economies and promote cooperation to achieve 
stable and sustainable world economic growth 
that benefits all’.
8
 The new group was not a 
decision-making body. Its objective was to help 
shape the international agenda and lead by 
example. 
 
From 1999 to 2008 there was an annual 
meeting of G20 finance ministers and central 
bank governors with the chair of each year’s 
meeting rotating among members. The 
meetings involved discussion across a wide 
range of economic issues. While considered 
very useful by participants, the forum did not 
attract significant public attention. What really 
transformed the role of the forum was the 
decision of US President, George W Bush, to 
convene a meeting of leaders from G20 
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countries in Washington, DC, in November 
2008 to consider ways to respond to the global 
financial crisis.   
 
What the G20 provided was a more inclusive 
and representative body than the G8. In 
particular, the G8’s record of engagement with 
emerging market and developing countries had 
been poor. By contrast, the key emerging-
market countries considered themselves equal 
members of the G20. But in the end, one of the 
chief advantages of the G20 as a mechanism to 
respond to the 2008 crisis was that it existed. 
This meant that time and political energy did 
not have to be wasted on deciding who should 
attend a global summit. 
 
Reflecting on the seven G20 leaders’ summits 
to date, as well as the associated ministerial and 
officials meetings, it is possible to identify nine 
key lessons in terms of both the successes and 
the failings of the G20.   
 
1) Leadership matters 
The history of the G20 underlines that 
leadership is vital. The willingness of key 
countries to take responsibility for 
championing major initiatives is central to the 
G20’s ability to tackle global economic 
challenges. It was the leadership of President 
Bush that resulted in the G20 leaders’ process. 
The United States also provided leadership in 
launching the Framework for Strong, 
Sustainable and Balanced Growth at the 2009 
Pittsburgh Summit that committed G20 
members to ‘...work together to assess how our 
policies fit together, to evaluate whether they 
are collectively consistent with more 
sustainable and balanced growth, and to act as 
necessary to meet our common objectives...’
9
.  
 
The G20’s history also shows that this 
leadership role is not limited to the United 
States. Other countries acting on their own or 
in concert with the United States or other 
members can be effective. The success of the 
2009 London Summit depended on the 
leadership of the British Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown, who enthusiastically took responsibility 
for ensuring the Summit produced real 
outcomes, including a $US1.1 trillion package 
of measures that included increasing the 
resources of the IMF. This increase in IMF 
resources was also crucially dependent on the 
willingness of Japan to be the first country to 
publicly commit to lending $US100 billion to 
the IMF. Another critical player was the US 
Treasury Secretary, Tim Geithner, who 
reversed the previous US Administration’s 
opposition to increasing IMF resources when 
he called for a $US500 billion increase in 
quotas along with a $US250 billion general 
SDR allocation.  
 
Leadership is not just the responsibility of the 
rotating chair of the G20. The chair needs 
champions both inside and outside the forum 
to get things done. In 2012, for example, Japan 
once again championed an increase in resources 
to the IMF by announcing a further $US100 
billion loan to temporarily increase the 
resources of the Fund. This led the way for 
other countries that wanted to make a 
commitment but were unwilling to be the first 
to do so for domestic political reasons. IMF 
Managing Director, Christine Lagarde, was 
also instrumental in achieving this outcome. 
What was significant about the 2012 increase 
in the IMF’s resources was that it did not 
involve the United States. 
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2) Leaders (and ministers) need to be involved 
The second lesson relates very closely to the 
first. The G20 is above all a political grouping. 
Its strength and effectiveness comes from the 
highest level of political involvement. Without 
this involvement the forum cannot achieve its 
full potential, overcome political obstacles and 
provide global leadership. Officials from 
member countries play important roles, but 
leaders and ministers have to be directly 
involved to achieve breakthroughs on critical 
issues.  
 
The 2009 London Summit, for example, was 
regarded as a major success, but participants 
went into the leaders’ meeting without 
agreement on the outcome. The formal agenda 
was largely abandoned as leaders negotiated 
the decisions and text of the final communiqué.  
 
At the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit, leaders 
committed to advancing quota and governance 
reform in the IMF. The breakthrough in 
settling the detail to implement this 
commitment was achieved at the Gyeongju 
meeting of G20 finance ministers and central 
bank governors in October 2010. However, 
this was not reached by officials nor in the 
formal meeting but at a side meeting of key 
ministers from the G7 and the emerging 
markets – Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa (known as the BRICS). 
 
Some of the most significant discussions at the 
2011 Cannes Summit also took place between 
leaders in the margins of the meeting. For 
example, Italy’s agreement to invite the IMF to 
carry out public verification of the 
implementation of Italy’s economic policies on 
a quarterly basis was reached in a side meeting 
of key leaders. 
The history of the G20 shows that for the 
forum to be effective, leaders have to be given 
the opportunity to lead. Officials are 
necessarily going to be involved in the 
preparation of summits and ministerial 
meetings, in particular to settle the draft 
communiqué before the meeting. Typically, 
they aim to avoid any discussion of the text in 
the actual meeting. The result, however, is 
often a resort to the lowest common 
denominator in terms of language, with large 
convoluted blocks of text attempting to cover 
competing viewpoints. Often when there has 
been difficulty in getting agreement on wording 
to advance an issue, the default has been to fall 
back on the language agreed in a previous 
communiqué.  
 
Hence, rather than officials trying to settle 
everything prior to the summit, the key 
controversial issues should be left for leaders 
(and ministers) to resolve. The challenge, 
however, is to identify what those (few) key 
issues should be and when they should be put 
in front of leaders. 
 
3) But leaders do not have to be involved in 
everything 
In the lead-up to the Cannes Summit, the 
British Prime Minister, David Cameron, 
prepared a report on global governance at the 
invitation of President Nicolas Sarkozy.
10
 The 
report did not attract discussion at the Cannes 
Summit and is only briefly mentioned in the 
Cannes Declaration. It was wide-ranging, and 
contains the important recommendation: 
‘[G20] resources, particularly its Leaders’ time 
and political capital, are limited. It must 
therefore manage its formal agenda 
accordingly, by balancing the changing agenda 
of an annual Presidency with the need to retain 
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focus and avoid overstretch.’
11
 If the G20 is 
really to be the premier forum for international 
economic coordination, it is important to make 
sure this happens. 
 
The complaint about the G20’s ever-expanding 
agenda has been made time and time again. 
Typically, the incoming chair inherits a long list 
of legacy issues and then adds new themes. 
Often this overcomes any good intentions that 
the chair might have had to focus the agenda. 
For example, Mexico approached its term as 
the chair in 2012 with the catch-phrase ‘back-
to -basics’, but removed little from the forum’s 
existing agenda for the Los Cabos Summit and 
added its own priority items, such as disaster 
risk management .  
 
Russia is chairing the G20 in 2013 and has 
indicated that it wants to streamline meetings 
and focus on outcomes. These are sound 
intentions. Nevertheless, the priorities identified 
for 2013 largely reflect those of previous years, 
to which Russia has added two new topics; 
financing for investment and government 
borrowing and public debt sustainability.
12
 
 
Each agenda item also involves a large number 
of sub-items. For example, the agenda item on 
financial regulation covers the work of the 
Financial Stability Board and various other 
agencies on financial inclusion and financial 
literacy. Invariably, all of this work finds its 
way on to the Leaders’ Summit Declaration. 
Financial regulation covered over five pages of 
the Cannes Summit Declaration and three 
pages of the Los Cabos Declaration. 
 
Closely related to this expanding agenda has 
been the growing number and variety of reports 
commissioned for G20 summits. For example, 
there were over 50 reports, materials and 
recommendations produced by international 
organisations for the 2011 Cannes Summit.
13
  
 
It is simply impossible for G20 leaders to 
consider all the agenda items or absorb all the 
material generated for their meetings.
14
 This is 
not to suggest that all this work is irrelevant. A 
great deal of valuable work is done in the 
various working groups established by the chair 
of each summit. For example, under the French 
chair in 2011, the Commodities Study Group 
produced a well-researched report on the key 
factors influencing movements in commodity 
prices and the role of financial commodity 
markets. Similarly, also during the French 
chair, the working group on the international 
monetary system produced the Coherent 
Conclusions for the Management of Capital 
Flows Drawing on Country Experiences. This 
represented a set of non-binding principles that 
came from intense discussions between 
advanced and emerging markets on what is a 
contentious issue. It was not headline-grabbing 
work, but it was still worthwhile. 
 
The challenge, therefore, is to cull the agenda 
for the leaders’ meeting and keep it focused on 
the most important issues while at the same 
time allowing the valuable work carried out by 
G20 ministers and officials to continue.  
 
4) Don’t get sidetracked 
One danger of a long and unfocused agenda is 
that it can serve as a distraction from important 
developments in the global economy. For 
example, while the G20 agenda was being 
expanded to cover such issues as financial 
inclusion, financial literacy, fossil fuel subsidies, 
anti-corruption, and protection of the marine 
environment, major issues that did not get 
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sufficient attention by the G20 between 2009 
and the early part of 2011 were the fragility of 
the global recovery and the intensification of 
the European sovereign debt crisis.  
 
The G20 has also spent a great deal of time and 
political capital in unproductive debates. The 
best example of this was the proposal at the 
2011 Seoul Summit to introduce a cap on the 
current account surplus or deficit of G20 
members. The failure to reach an agreement on 
this issue led to a compromise to develop 
indicators of persistently large imbalances – 
both external (such as current account surplus 
or deficit) and internal (such as fiscal deficits 
and public and private debt levels) – that may 
pose a systemic risk, and ‘indicative guidelines’ 
that would identify countries that had such 
imbalances and needed to be assessed. A great 
deal of time, effort and political capital was 
used up in the first few months of the French 
presidency to agree on the indicators and the 
‘indicative guidelines’, despite the fact that it 
was already clear which countries had 
imbalances that required further assessment. In 
the end, the guidelines were not published and 
were virtually reverse engineered to ensure that 
all the major economies – namely China, 
France, Germany, India, Japan, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom – were 
included.  
 
5) Action builds credibility 
Unsurprisingly, those leaders’ summits 
perceived to have been most successful were the 
ones that were seen to take real action. The 
Washington Summit, for example, concluded 
with a specific action plan along with a 
timetable for implementation. The action plan 
heavily incorporated recommendations from an 
April 2008 report from the then Financial 
Stability Forum. While the specific 
recommendations may not have been new, their 
inclusion allowed the Washington Declaration 
to go beyond rhetoric. Likewise, the main 
headline from the London Summit was the 
$US1.1 trillion package of measures to restore 
‘credit, growth and jobs’ and a $5 trillion 
combined fiscal stimulus package. Both helped 
restore global confidence, even if some of the 
components of the aggregate figure were more 
aspirational than real.
15
  
 
Demonstrating action is not straightforward, 
however. Many countries went into the 2011 
Cannes Summit calling for another ‘London 
moment’ through an agreement to significantly 
increase the resources of the IMF. Agreement 
was not achieved at Cannes, but commitments 
were made at the April 2012 meeting of G20 
finance ministers to temporarily increase IMF 
resources by more than $US450 billion. This 
was a significant achievement, but it did not 
have the same confidence-building impact as 
the measures agreed at the London Summit. 
There were several reasons for this: the number 
may not have been big enough to have a major 
impact; the growing recognition that the 
problems confronting the global economy, 
particularly the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, 
were complex and likely to be protracted; and 
the failure of countries like the United States 
and Canada to contribute sent conflicting 
messages about the G20’s resolve. But perhaps 
the underlying lesson was that markets are 
increasingly raising the bar in terms of big 
outcomes at leaders’ summits.  
 
6) Lack of action destroys credibility 
What does, however, undermine the credibility 
of the G20 is a lack of action. A prime example 
of this has been the way that the repeated, but 
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unrealised, commitments made to complete the 
Doha Development Round have damaged the 
G20’s standing. In Washington in 2008, leaders 
said they would ‘strive to reach agreement this 
year on modalities that leads to a successful 
conclusion to the WTO’s Development Agenda 
with an ambitious and balanced outcome’.
16
 In 
London in 2009 they were ‘...committed to 
reaching an ambitious and balanced conclusion 
to the Doha Development Round, which is 
urgently needed’.
17
 At the Seoul Summit, the 
leaders said 2011 represented a ‘critical 
window of opportunity’ and ‘we now need to 
complete the end game’ and ‘we direct our 
negotiators to engage in across-the-board 
negotiations to promptly bring the Doha 
Development Round to a successful, ambitious 
and balanced conclusion…’.
18
 It was only at the 
Cannes Summit that a dose of reality was 
injected into the Declaration which noted that 
‘...it is clear that we will not complete the DDA 
if we continue to conduct negotiations as we 
have in the past….To contribute confidence, we 
need to pursue in 2012 fresh, credible 
approaches to furthering negotiations’.
19
  
 
It is even more damaging if measures agreed by 
G20 members are reversed or ignored. For 
example, a major achievement of the 
Washington Summit was a standstill on trade 
and investment protectionist measures that was 
extended at subsequent summits. Despite this 
agreement, a number of G20 members still 
imposed national trade restrictions that 
undermined the credibility of the forum, even if 
these restrictions did not have a significant 
impact on global trade.   
 
7) Make sure the messages are clear 
The communiqué issued at the inaugural 
Washington Summit was a tightly written 
document of ten pages. But just as the agenda 
for the G20 has grown, so too has the amount 
of documentation coming from summits. The 
2010 Seoul Summit produced a Leaders’ 
Declaration, a Seoul Summit Document which 
included the Seoul Action Plan, and annexes 
covering the Seoul Development Consensus for 
Shared Growth, a Multi-year Action plan on 
Development, an Anti-Corruption Action Plan 
and a 49-page table covering Policy 
Commitments by G20 members. The 2011 
Cannes Summit produced a Final Declaration, 
a Final Communiqué, the Cannes Action Plan 
for Growth, the G20 Action Plan to Support 
Development of Local Currency Bond Markets, 
G20 Principles for Cooperation between the 
IMF and Regional Financing Arrangements 
amongst a host of other documents. With so 
much documentation, key messages can be lost. 
There has also been a significant increase in the 
length of communiqués from the meetings of 
finance ministers and central bank governors, 
with descriptive paragraphs and lengthy 
references to reports prepared by international 
bodies. The G20 process needs to replace 
quantity with quality, and devote more time 
and effort to ensuring that clear and succinct 
messages emerge from summits. 
 
8) Targets and timetables can be effective, but 
be careful 
The communiqué of the inaugural Washington 
Summit communicated a sense of urgency by 
assigning deadlines to its action items. This 
focused the minds of officials and ensured that 
actions were completed in line with the 
commitments made by leaders. Nevertheless, 
whilst the use of timelines and deadlines has 
become standard practice, there is often 
insufficient consideration as to whether the 
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time-frames assigned to particular tasks are 
realistic.   
 
Often, a key driver is simply the desire to have 
a task completed ahead of the next summit. For 
example, the June 2010 Toronto Summit 
agreed to draft a new framework that would 
raise capital standards for banks (Basel III). The 
framework was to be agreed by the November 
2010 Seoul Summit. Yet there was little 
discussion of whether this timetable was 
appropriate or realistic given that the Seoul 
Summit was scheduled only five months after 
the Toronto Summit. In the end, new capital 
and liquidity standards were agreed, but 
questions were raised about their impact. In 
fact, it was later necessary to amend these 
standards and extend the time-frame for their 
implementation. A better outcome would have 
been achieved if more time had been allowed 
for their development.  
 
Similar factors are at play with the timetable 
established at the 2010 Toronto Summit for 
implementing over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives regulation and supervision. This is a 
complex exercise and the full dimension of the 
project was not appreciated when the 
commitment was made. In hindsight, more time 
considering the extent and implementation of 
the reforms may have helped minimise the 
regulatory uncertainty associated with the 
exercise, particularly concerns over conflicts, 
inconsistencies and gaps in respective national 
frameworks.  
 
The use of targets in the G20 has also focused 
action and helped achieve results. A major issue 
in the lead-up to the 2009 London Summit was 
the size of the fiscal stimulus by G20 members. 
The IMF recommended that a discretionary 
fiscal stimulus of two per cent of aggregate G20 
GDP in 2009 and 2010 was required. This 
provided a benchmark to assess the adequacy 
of the combined response by G20 members. 
 
At the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit, the 
commitment to reform the voting shares in the 
World Bank and the quota distribution in the 
IMF was given greater credibility when leaders 
targeted an increase of at least three per cent of 
voting power for development and transition 
countries in the World Bank, and a shift in 
quota shares in the IMF to dynamic emerging 
and developing countries of at least five per 
cent. This meant there was a target for the 
negotiations and a measure to assess whether 
the commitments were achieved. 
 
But as with time-frames for action, care has to 
be taken in setting targets. In particular, the 
G20 needs to avoid being a slave to summit 
commitments that may no longer be 
appropriate given changes in global economic 
circumstances. For example, a major outcome 
of the 2010 Toronto Summit was the 
commitment by member countries to tighten 
their budgets to reduce public debt to GDP 
levels. Advanced economies committed to 
halving fiscal deficits by 2013 and stabilising or 
reducing government debt to GDP levels by 
2016. Given ongoing weaknesses in the global 
economy, however, there is a real question as 
to whether these commitments made in 2010 
remain appropriate for all countries today.  
 
9) ‘It’s the economy, stupid’ 
The G20 leaders’ process was convened to 
respond to the financial and economic crisis 
that was confronting the global economy in 
2008. The London Summit was applauded as a 
crucial factor in avoiding a larger global 
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recession. There was a self-congratulatory 
flavour to the communiqué of the 2009 
Pittsburgh Summit, in which leaders declared 
that the world had confronted the ‘greatest 
challenge in our generation’ but ‘our countries 
agreed to do everything necessary to ensure the 
recovery’ and ‘it worked’.
20
 Similar sentiments 
were expressed at the subsequent Toronto and 
Seoul Summits. 
 
This early confidence that the G20 had 
successfully tackled the world’s main economic 
problems led to suggestions that the forum 
tackle other broader issues in a ‘post-crisis’ 
world. But ‘victory’ was declared too soon. The 
fact that today there is much less confidence 
that the world is through its economic 
difficulties only underlines the need for the G20 
to stay focused on the threats and challenges 
confronting the global economy. To borrow 
from the campaign slogan from Bill Clinton’s 
1992 bid for the US presidency, ‘it’s the 
economy, stupid’. 
 
The overarching objective of G20 leaders, 
supported by the efforts of finance ministers 
and central bank governors, should be to 
implement the policy measures needed to 
achieve stronger, more sustainable and more 
balanced economic growth. At the 2009 
Pittsburgh Summit the leaders agreed on a 
mechanism to do just that – the Framework for 
Strong Sustainable and Balanced Growth. The 
Framework provides a process for G20 
countries to identify the vulnerabilities in the 
global economy and to come up with the 
policies required to address those vulnerabilities 
and achieve sustained economic and jobs 
growth. Underlying the Framework is the 
recognition that while each G20 member bears 
primary responsibility for the sound 
management of its economy, collectively the 
G20 has the responsibility for the overall health 
of the global economy. As such, the Framework 
is a concept that commits G20 members to 
assess how their policies fit together, whether 
they are consistent with achieving shared 
objectives, and an undertaking to take the 
necessary action to ensure that this is the case. 
Through the Mutual Assessment Process, the 
Framework also provides a means to ensure 
that members implement these policies. The 
Framework embodies the cooperation that was 
the hallmark of the G20 members’ response to 
the global financial crisis and underlines their 
recognition of a mutual responsibility for 
global economic outcome. The Framework is, 
however, still seen by some G20 members as a 
self- contained item on the leaders' agenda. 
What it offers, however, is a central narrative 
through which the G20 can present a coherent 
and comprehensive message of what policy 
steps each member country is taking to achieve 
enhanced economic outcomes for all. 
 
 
To be effective the G20 has to be focused 
 
The G20 has achieved a great deal. There is 
now a much closer dialogue between emerging-
market and developed countries than existed 
prior to the crisis. The Framework for Strong 
Sustainable and Balanced Growth is an historic 
exercise in mutual surveillance, in contrast to 
what was often perceived as external 
surveillance by international bodies like the 
IMF. The G20 has helped reduce policy 
tensions between countries. It has contributed 
to positive policy developments in major 
emerging markets, such as China’s moves 
towards greater exchange rate flexibility and its 
efforts to boost domestic demand. The G20 has 
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helped drive a major effort to strengthen the 
regulatory framework for the financial system 
through the work of the Financial Stability 
Board. It has also generated significant 
governance reforms in the World Bank and the 
IMF.     
 
But while these achievements should be 
acknowledged, issues relating to the 
effectiveness of the G20 must be confronted. 
The forum needs to build on what has worked, 
and avoid what has not. For this to happen, 
there has to be recognition by all G20 members 
that change is required. 
 
The G20 must maintain its focus and not lose 
its inherent strength, namely the engagement of 
leaders. But to achieve this there needs to be a 
circuit-breaker to move beyond the current 
approach whereby each year’s chair builds on 
the agenda and processes of their predecessors. 
Without a break with the past the G20 will be 
left with an ever-expanding agenda and 
procedures that will undermine the 
effectiveness and credibility of the forum. 
 
To prepare ground for change the following 
approach should be pursued: 
 
Start the conversation about change within the 
Troika in 2013: the Russian chair is already 
seeking to focus the agenda and improve the 
processes of the forum, and this should be fully 
supported. But there should also be a broader 
discussion within the Troika about the need for 
a fundamental overhaul of the G20 processes. 
 
Hold a high-level seminar: Australia, as 2014 
chair, should convene a high-level evaluation 
seminar at the end of 2013 to discuss how G20 
processes could be made more effective. It 
should be more than a talk-shop. There should 
be a pragmatic discussion on specific changes 
that would enhance the effectiveness of the 
G20. The seminar could be held back-to-back 
with the first sherpas’ meeting under the 
Australian chair in December 2013. 
 
Drawing on the outcomes from the seminar, 
Australia, as chair, should prepare specific 
proposals for what could be termed the 
‘relaunch’ of the G20 in 2014 in order to 
reform its procedures and agenda. These 
proposals should be discussed at meetings of 
G20 finance deputies and sherpas. The 
proposed changes could then be discussed at 
the first meeting of G20 finance ministers and 
central bank governors in 2014, and agreed 
changes adopted for the 2014 leaders’ summit. 
In particular, Australia should make changes to 
the way the leaders’ agenda is decided and 
progressed in 2014 and establish this as a 
precedent for subsequent years. The goal 
should be to keep the G20 leaders focused on 
the key issues, maximise their involvement in 
areas where they can make a difference, and 
ensure that the messages coming from their 
summits are clearly communicated.  
 
In terms of the substance of any change, the 
following ideas, drawing on the lessons learned 
above, could form the basis for discussions to 
relaunch the G20: 
 
A multi-tracked approach: rather than leaders 
attempting, or pretending, to cover all items on 
the G20 agenda, a focused leaders’ agenda 
should be adopted alongside a single leaders’ 
declaration or communiqué. Much of the 
current work within the G20 could continue at 
the official level and in consultation with the 
international organisations. The outcome of 
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this work would be reported on a dedicated 
G20 website, rather than being part of the 
leaders’ communiqué from each year’s summit.  
 
The meetings of finance ministers and central 
bank governors should also be more focused 
and strategic, which would be reflected in 
shorter and more targeted communiqués so 
that the key messages are not lost. 
 
Leaders’ and ministers’/ governors’ meetings 
should be as interactive as possible: lengthy 
presentations by international organisations or 
status reports on work programs should be 
eliminated. These matters should be covered in 
documents tabled in advance of the meetings. 
The practice of having many ‘lead speakers’ for 
each agenda item should be dropped. Formal 
set-piece interventions should be discouraged. 
The chair of the meeting should ensure that the 
discussions are focused on achieving an 
‘outcome’. 
 
The measure of success for drafting leaders’ 
and ministers’ communiqués should not be a 
text that avoids all contentious issues: the 
objective of officials should always be to 
facilitate a meaningful discussion between 
leaders, ministers, and central bank governors. 
That means officials should focus on 
identifying the critical roadblocks that need to 
be discussed by leaders and ministers. The chair 
of the leaders’ and various ministerial meetings 
should be encouraging debate, and hopefully 
resolution, on the areas of difference. 
 
Keep the focus on the economy: given the 
considerable uncertainties confronting the 
global economy, the focus of the G20 leaders’ 
and ministerial processes should remain on the 
economy. If the G20 is really to be the premier 
forum for international economic cooperation, 
its main focus must be on helping to stabilise 
the global economy and achieving sustainable 
economic and jobs growth. It must not be 
distracted and should be flexible in responding 
to changes in global economic conditions. 
 
The Framework for Strong Sustainable and 
Balanced Growth and the MAP should be 
central to the G20’s agenda and narrative: the 
Framework provides a pathway for moving to 
a post-crisis world that is characterised by 
strong, more sustainable and more balanced 
economic growth. It should be the mechanism 
that is used to respond to all vulnerabilities 
confronting the global economy and is flexible 
enough to respond to the unexpected. It should 
also be central to the G20’s public narrative, 
used to demonstrate that the objectives and 
policy measures or member states are 
consistent.   
 
The risk, however, is that the Framework and 
the MAP will degenerate into a routine, 
procedural exercise for technocrats. To avoid 
this happening, finance ministers and central 
bank governors should consider ways to 
strengthen the MAP.
21
 These would include: 
ensuring that there are common goals and the 
need for complementary policy action; fostering 
an active debate between leaders, ministers and 
governors on key areas of dispute; keeping the 
Framework  member-led while fully utilising 
the assessments undertaken by the international 
organisations of members’ policy  performance 
in order to enhance accountability; focusing 
more extensively on the ‘up-side’ scenarios 
presented by the IMF staff; and recognising the 
need to balance short-term policy imperatives 
with desirable medium-term actions. 
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Conclusion 
 
Many observers of, and participants in, the 
G20 agree that an ever-expanding agenda is 
damaging the effectiveness of the forum and 
that it is being weighed down by a growing 
amount of procedural baggage. The G20 must 
maintain its focus, but to do so there must be a 
distinct break with the procedures of the past.  
G20 members have to collectively agree that 
the forum will not simply follow established 
practices and will in future do things 
differently.  In this regard it will be important 
to learn from the history of the forum and 
retain what has worked, and dispense with 
what has not.  This is a challenge Australia 
should take up when it chairs the G20 in 2014. 
 
In particular, the G20 needs to build on its key 
strength, namely its ability to bring together the 
leaders of the world’s most important 
economies to confront key global economic 
challenges.  This means taking steps to ensure 
that the interest and engagement of G20 leaders 
is retained, including by ensuring that their 
agenda is focused only on the most important 
and unresolved issues. Moreover, given the 
uncertainty and fragility of the global economic 
environment, the highest priority of the G20 
should be on restoring sustainable growth. This 
will continue to be the key measure of the 
forum’s credibility and its ability to realise its 
potential for global economic leadership. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
NOTES 
1 President Obama news conference, 2 April 2009: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/news-
conference-president-obama-40209. 
2 Bradford, Colin and Johannes Linn, The April 
2009 London G-20 Summit in retrospect. Brookings 
Institution, 5 April 2010: 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/0
4/05-g20-summit-linn. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Giles, Chris, G20 reform: time to take action – or 
risk irrelevance. Financial Times, 18 June 2012. 
5 Bradford, Colin. National perspectives on global 
leadership during the Los Cabos G20 Summit. CIGI, 
7 September 2012: 
http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2012/7/natio
nal-perspectives-global-leadership-during-los-cabos-
g20-summit. 
6 Ibid. 
7 G20 Information Centre .The Group of Twenty: a 
history: 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/docs/g20history.pdf. 
8 Ibid. 
9 G20 leader’s statement: the Pittsburgh Summit, 
Pittsburgh, 24-25 September 2009: 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique
0925.html. 
10 Cameron, David. Governance for growth: building 
consensus for the future. London, November 2011: 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/Governance-for-
growth.pdf. 
11 Ibid.  
12 www.g20.org/docs/g20_russia/priorities.html. 
13 Larionova, Marina. From the Mexican to the 
Russian G20 Presidency. G20 update, issue 13. 
Heinrich Böll Stiftung e-newsletter, September 2012: 
http://www.in.boell.org/downloads/PDF820B.pdf. 
14 Ibid. 
  
Page 15 
A n a l y s i s  
Relaunching the G20 
                                                                                   
15 Bradford and Linn, The April 2009 London G-20 
Summit in retrospect. 
16 Declaration of the summit on financial markets 
and the world economy, Washington, DC, 15 
November 2008: 
http://www.G20.utoronto.ca/2008/2008declaration1
115.html. 
17 London Summit – Leaders’ statement, London, 2 
April 2009: 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique
0402.pdf. 
18 The G20 Seoul Summit leaders’ declaration. Seoul, 
12 November 2010: 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul.html.  
19 Cannes Summit final declaration – Building our 
common future: renewed collective action for the 
benefit of all. Cannes, 4 November 2011: 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-
declaration-111104-en.html. 
20 G20 leaders statement: the Pittsburgh Summit.  
21 See for example the proposals in Kevin English; 
Xenia Menzies; Jacob Muirhead and Jennifer 
Prenger, A map for strengthening the G20 Mutual 
Assessment Process, CIGI Junior Fellows Policy Brief 
No. 2, September 2012: 
http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2012/9/map-
strengthening-g20-mutual-assessment-process. 
 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mike Callaghan is the Director of the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
Prior to taking up this position, Mike was Executive Director, International, in the Australian Treasury 
and Australia’s G20 Finance Deputy. He was also the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy on the 
International Economy. From 2005 to 2007, Mike was Executive Director, Revenue Group in the 
Australian Treasury where he was responsible for the provision of advice to Ministers on taxation and 
retirement income policies and legislation. In 2006 he was appointed by the IMF Managing Director 
and the President of the World Bank to an eminent persons group to report on improving cooperation 
between the World Bank and the IMF. From 2000 to 2004 Mike was Executive Director at the 
International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, representing a constituency of 14 countries, including 
Australia. Mike has served as Chief of Staff to the Australian Treasurer, the Hon Peter Costello. He 
joined the Treasury in 1974 and has held a variety of senior positions, including heading the Economic 
Division and the Financial Institutions Division. He has economic and law degrees from the Australian 
National University and is a graduate from the Royal College of Defence Studies, London.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
www.lowyinstitute.org 
